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Legal Malpractice and Compulsory
Client Protection
By BENJAMIN FRANLIN BOYER*
GARY CONNER"
One question that has emerged from the legal profession's recent
reexamination of professional liability insurance plans is whether the
attorney as an individual or the legal profession as an aggregate owes
the public a duty to ensure compensation for the client-victim who is
injured as a result of attorney malpractice.
One proposed solution to the dual quandary of expanding ethical
concerns and escalating insurance premiums is the Professional Lia-
bility Fund.' Under this proposal each attorney in private practice
would be compelled to contribute to a fund that would be used to
recompense those who can prove that they have been damaged as
a result of attorney malpractice. These pooled funds would be ad-
ministered much like a claims-made liability insurance plan.2 The ad-
o A.B., 1926, J.D., 1928, University of Missouri; LL.M., 1940, Columbia Uni-
versity; LL.D., 1952, Waynesburg College; LL.D., 1959 Dickinson School of Law.
** B.A., 1972, California State University, Fullerton. Member, Second Year Class.
1. See Oft. REv. STAT. §§ 9.080, 9.191 as amended July 20, 1977, in conjunction
with Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Oregon State Bar, 1977 Annual Meet-
ing; A.B. 209 (1977-1978) Regular Session, California State Legislature, Jan. 13, 1977,
as amended June 15, 1977. In Oregon the plan is referred to as the Professional Lia-
bility Fund, and in California it is known as the Client Protection Fund. The authors
have chosen to use the former designation in order to prevent the reader from confusing
this plan with the Client Security Fund, which serves a different but related function.
See notes 40-42, 60-83 & accompanying text infra.
2. There are two basic forms of professional liability coverage: occurrence and.
claims-made. The occurrence type insures the attorney for the year in which the act
complained of occurred, regardless of when the claim is actually made. The claims-
made type insures the attorney against any claim made during the year of coverage
regardless of when the act complained of occurred. The former requires the carrier
to retain a greater capital reserve in anticipation of potential losses based upon years
past for which the collected premium must be sufficient. The latter requires less capital
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ministrators of this public corporation would defend the attorney
accused of malpractice and pay an adverse judgment up to specified
limits. 3
Reaction to the Professional Liability Fund has differed signifi-
cantly in the two states in which it has been formally proposed. In
Oregon the proposal was seen primarily as a public service, and op-
position was negligible.4 The plan moved through the Legislature
without objection and was immediately implemented by the Oregon
State Bar. In California there has been a great deal of opposition
to the Fund. The public protection aspect of the plan has been ob-
scured by contests over whether it would serve all lawyers well and
whether the compulsory features of the plan are legal.6 The State
Bar of California recently polled that state's lawyers on the accepta-
bility of the Professional Liability Fund.7  Approximately half of the
bar responded to the poll with fifty-two percent favoring the proposal
and forty-eight percent disapproving." The legislators who had intro-
duced the bill that would have authorized the Professional Liability
Fund then amended the legislation to set up a committee to study the
problem9 and even that proposal was vetoed by the Governor. 10
The narrow scope of this Article necessarily excludes the presenta-
tion of a model program and, consequently, the multitudinous policy
decisions concerning specific provisions of a public protection-profes-
sional liability plan are not addressed. The authors attempt only to
demonstrate that the Professional Liability Fund meets the present
need and does so within the existing legal framework.
reserves because the loss for any year is known at year's end. The disadvantage to
the attorney of claims-made insurance is the need to continue to carry liability insurance
after discontinuing the practice of law until the statute of limitations has barred claims
arising from the practice. See PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE FOR LAWYERS AND ACCOUNTANTS 13 (1976).
3. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 9.080, 9.191 as amended July 20, 1977, in conjunction
with Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Oregon State Bar, 1977 Annual Meet-
ing; A.B. 209 (1977-1978) Regular Session, California State Legislature, Jan. 13, 1977,
as amended June 15, 1977.
4. Letter from Herbert C. Hardy of the Oregon Bar to Benjamin F. Boyer (Oct.
24, 1977) (on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., STATE BAR OF CAL., Reports 2 (July and Aug. (1977)) [hereinafter
cited as Reports]; letters from members of the State Bar of California (on file with The
Hastings Law Journal).
7. Reports, supra note 6, at 1 (July 1977).
8. Reports, supra note 6, at 1 (Aug. 1977).
9. A.B. 209 (1977-1978) Regular Session, California State Legislature, as amended
Sept. 14, 1977 (Assembly), Sept. 15, 1977 (Senate).
10. Id., vetoed Oct. 1, 1977, ASSEMBLY IOURNAL, Oct. 6, 1977, at 10156.
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The Need For A Client Protection - Professional
Liability Plan
Because the Professional Liability Fund would eliminate private
carriers from the basic coverage market in this field and compel par-
ticipation by the state's attorneys, the Fund can be justified only if
an important underlying and unmet need exists. Although there is
a dearth of reliable data on the actual claims experience of the Ameri-
can lawyer,1 what is known indicates a serious problem.
Nationwide, approximately one-third of the active bar is not
covered by any professional liability insurance.' 2  This incredible
lack of coverage, with its concomitant risks to clients as well as to
lawyers themselves, coincides with a dramatic increase in the in-
cidence of claims. Since 1959 there has been a steep and continuous
rise in the relative frequency of malpractice claims against attorneys.' 3
According to the Insurance Service Organization, a national data
collection service, claims doubled between 1970 and 1975 from 6,780
to 13,333 .4 The sums paid on these claims more than tripled, from
$33,000,000 to $111,000,000.15 One commentator reported a rise in
claims from 1.8 per 100 attorneys in 1973 to an expected incidence of
7.2 per 100 attorneys in 1976.16 In addition, the cost of the average
award has been increasing by twenty-five percent per year.' 7  These
data are useful, however, only to the extent they suggest a problem
11. See Note, Improving Information on Legal Malpractice, 82 YALE L.J. 590
(1973).
12. Woytash, Lawyer Malpractice: Is a Crisis Coming?, BA LEADERV 18, 21 (Oct.
1976) [hereinafter cited as Woytash]. In Oregon it is estimated that 40% of the bar
has no liability coverage; see letter from Herbert C. Hardy to Benjamin F. Boyer
(Oct. 24, 1977) (on file with The Hastings Law Journal). For California figures, see
text accompanying note 22 infra.
13. R. MALLEN & V. LEvrrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 15 (1977).
14. Statement of the Board of Governors, Oregon State Bar, 1977 Annual Meeting
at 1. Woytash, supra note 12, at 23 (reporting a tripling of claims in a three-year
period).
15. Statement of the Board of Governors, Oregon State Bar, 1977, Annual Meet-
ing at 1.
16. Woytash, supra note 12, at 23. In California the incidence of claims for 1976
was expected to be 6.6 per 100 insureds. Booz, Allen Consulting Actuarial Review
of a Legislative Proposal for State Bar of California (April 8, 1977), app. I, exhibit
1 (on file with the Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Booz, Allen].
17. Woytash, supra note 12, at 23. In California the average award is estimated to
be $20,000 for 1978. Booz, Allen, supra note 16, at app. II. But see Stern, The Virginia
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and a trend; virtually no statistics on the actual claims experience of
the uninsured attorney exist. Additionally, there is no way to gauge
how many clients decide not to press their claims upon discovering
that their attorneys have no professional liability insurance.
As the number of claims and the cost of awards have risen, there
have been emphatic reactions in the insurance industry. Between
1972 and 1976 sixteen of the twenty companies offering professional
liability insurance stopped accepting new applications for coverage."
This flight from the field has occurred notwithstanding sharply es-
calating premium charges. Within a period of two years, premiums
have increased by at least 500% in California,' 9 400% in Ohio, 600%
in Arizona, and at least 300% in other states.20  This rise in premium
costs has occurred notwithstanding a general switchover from occur-
rence coverage to the less expensive claims-made type of insurance.
2'
As the cost of insurance continues to outpace a general rise in
income, it is reasonable to expect that fewer attorneys will voluntarily
pay the higher premiums. In California alone approximately 20,000
of the state's 55,000 attorneys are uninsured. 22  As a consequence of
this anticipated increase in the number of uninsured practitioners,
increasingly more clients are exposed to the risk of loss based on un-
collectible damages from negligent attorneys. Many clients, further-
more, will voluntarily forego their valid claims rather than sue the
uninsured attorney.
Although substantiating statistics are not available, it is reason-
able to assume that, for financial reasons, recent admittees to the bar
and others with economically marginal practices are disproportionately
represented among the uninsured. The inexperienced attorney may
Attorney Malpractice Experience, 22 VA. B. NEWS 11 (1974), reprinted in D. STERN,
AN ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO MALPRACTICE LIABILITY 53, 55 (1977), where the author
reports a median and mean claim against Virginia attorneys of less than $5,000 in 1972.
18. Stern, Malpractice is a Lawyer's Problem Too, BARRISTER 26, 28 (Spring
1976). Cf. Folsum, Attorney's Professional Liability Insurance, BRIEF CASE 10 (Sum-
mer 1976) (five companies offer professional liability insurance for attorneys).
19. Folsum, Attorney's Professional Liability Insurance, BRIEF CASE 10 (Summer
1976). The author reports a rise in premiums of 125% in 1975 and 383% in 1976.
It is reported that yearly premiums have risen from approximately $300 before the
1976 increase to $2,100 in 1977. Reports, supra note 6, at 7 (July 1977).
20. Stern, Malpractice is a Lawyer's Problem Too, BARRISTER 26, 28 (Spring 1976).
See also Woytash, supra note 12, at 21.
21. Stem, Malpractice is a Lawyer's Problem Too, BARniSTER 26, 28 (Spring 1976).
22. The Recorder, Aug. 8, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
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also be more likely to commit the common errors that harm the client.
It is estimated that as much as forty-five percent of malpractice results
from time lapses such as missed filing deadlines and the running of
statutes of limitations.23  To the extent that the attorney with an
economically marginal practice is represented among the uninsured,
one can assume that he or she is less able to respond in damages when
a client is injured through incompetence or neglect.
Action directed towards compelling attorneys to carry professional
liability insurance with private firms is unlikely to solve the problem.
Insurance cannot reasonably be demanded as a condition of licensure
unless the carriers are required to accept all applicants. The insur-
ance industry, otherwise, could effectively "disbar" those who failed
to meet their insurability criteria. Although the present rate of cov-
erage refusal may be as low as one-half of one percent, 24 insurance
companies resist being required to accept the high risk minority.2a
An assigned risk program, assuming it is an available alternative,
probably would cause an increase in premiums substantially greater
than the present escalating rates. The pool of attorneys from which
the insurers must draw their funds is very small in relation to other
liability insurance pools, and, in combination with there being so few
carriers remaining in the field, there is little room over which to spread
the greater anticipated loss.
As an example of the insurance industry's reluctance to accept all
risks in this field, the state of Washington's experience is instructive.
When the Washington State Bar petitioned the state supreme court
for a rule of court requiring all attorneys to carry professional liability
insurance, the only insurer in the field withdrew.26  It appears, fur-
thermore, that the state cannot compel companies offering other kinds
of liability insurance to enter the professional liability field. 27  North
Carolina attempted to ease its crisis in medical liability insurance by
requiring virtually all of the insurance companies that handled some
23. Note, Improving Information on Legal Malpractice, 82 YALE L.J. 590, 603 n.55.
Compare id. with Woytash, supra note 12, at 19.
24. Agenda Item, California State Bar Meeting (April 24, 1975) (on file with
The Hastings Law Journal).
25. Id. See text accompanying notes 26-28 infra.
26. Letter from G. Edward Friar, Executive Director, Washington State Bar As-
sociation to Benjamin F. Boyer (Sept. 29, 1977) (on file with The Hastings Law
Journal).
27. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Ingram, 290 N.C. 457, 226 S.E.2d 498
(1976).
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kind of liability insurance to join a state medical malpractice pool.21
The North Carolina Supreme Court in invalidating the statute held
that professional liability insurance is a business different in kind from
other forms of insurance. Because such coverage requires unique ex-
pertise on the part of the carrier, a company cannot be required to
engage in it as a condition of carrying on a totally different business..2 9
As these two instances illustrate, although mandatory insurance
from private companies would protect the public from the threat of
loss, it is probably not a realistic alternative. Even if it were avail-
able, the cost may be so prohibitive as to preclude a substantial num-
ber of attorneys from practicing law. The ethical duty to provide the
public with protection from professional negligence and the need to
provide attorneys with a source of coverage at a reasonable price
requires, however, some alternative to the inadequate system of vol-
untary coverage with private carriers now in effect.
A professional liability fund would not only protect the thousands
of clients who now, practically speaking, have no present remedy
against execution-proof lawyers for their injury, but it would also
benefit the profession. It has been estimated that such a plan would
provide savings of thirty-five to fifty percent over comparable private
insurance30 More importantly, the bar's voluntary development of
a client protection plan would go a long way toward restoring public
confidence in a profession that has in many other ways accepted
its responsibility to protect the public from inadequate legal counsel.
The Existing Logic
The legal profession has long recognized its duty to protect the
public from incompetence and misconduct.3 1  Every state has estab-
lished minimum educational requirements for applicants to the bar.
32
In addition, most states require prospective lawyers to prove their
28. An Act to Establish a Health Care Liability Reinsurance Exchange, 1975 N.C.
Sess. Laws, ch. 427, § 2.
29. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Ingram, 290 N.C. 457, 226 S.E.2d 498
(1976).
30. Booz, Allen, supra note 16, at 3-6.
31. As early as 1401 A.D. the courts of England were allowed to regulate who
could practice before them. State v. Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 385, 240 N.W. 441, 446
(1932) (quoting 4 HENRY IV, ch. 18).
32. See, e.g., ABA LAW SCHOOLS AND BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS at 49 (1975).
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competency by passing a thorough examination.33 Once the scholastic
requirements are met, the bar candidate must satisfy the state that
he or she is morally fit and deserving of the public trust.3 4  Addition-
ally, a growing number of states require attorneys to participate in
continuing legal education programs.3 5
Notwithstanding these elaborate safeguards, some attorneys still
neglect their client's interests, and a few fail to meet the minimal
standards of professional competence. To guide the practicing law-
yer and to establish disciplinary standards, states have adopted rules
of professional conduct. 36 These professional codes are also a part
of the public protection scheme. In Ames v. State Bar of California,
3 7
the Supreme Court of California explicitly recognized this dual func-
tion: "The Rules of Professional Conduct are intended not only to
establish ethical standards for members of the bar, but are also de-
signed to protect the public."38
American Bar Association Rules of Professional Responsibility
Ethical Consideration (EC) 2-7 acknowledges that in our modern,
complex, and mobile society the public is frequently unable to make
an informed choice as to the competency of counsel to be retained
and that generally any given lawyer may be incompetent to handle
some legal matters. 39  Under EC 6-340 lawyers are, nonetheless, al-
33. Alphabetical State-by-State Listing of Bar Requirements, 2 BEFORE THEBA
7 (1976-77); see Robertson & Buehler, The Separation of Powers and the Regulation
of the Practice of Law in Oregon, 13 WILLAmETTE L.J. 273, 291 (1977), where the
authors report that four states (Montana, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin)
have diploma privilege. All four states have the privilege through court order as well
as statute. See, e.g., W. VA. Sup. CT. R. 1.202; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-2-1 (1972).
34. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6060(b), 6062(b) (West 1974);
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Examiners
of N.M. 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 333, 378 (1866);
In re Stepsay, 15 Cal. 2d 71, 73, 98 P.2d 489, 489-90 (1940); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d
288 (1959).
35. Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Iowa now have mandatory continuing education
of the bar. Benjamin, You Must Go Back to Class, BARmSTA 30, 32 (Spring 1976).
36. WISE, LEGAL ETmCS Xi (Supp. Jan. 1977), reports that 49 states and the
District of Columbia have adopted the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. This
information comes from the foreward to the 1975 edition. In 1975 California, the lone
holdout, adopted disciplinary rules based on the ABA Code. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 6076 (West Supp. 1977). Because of variations in the text actually adopted by the
states, the reader must examine the code in the particular state whose rules are of
concern.
37. 8 Cal. 3d 910, 606 P.2d 625, 106 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1973).
38. Id. at 917, 606 P.2d at 629, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 493 (citations omitted).
39. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBLrry (1975).
40. Id.
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lowed to accept such cases if they have a good faith intention to be-
come competent. Recognizing that the public is, therefore, at a special
disadvantage in dealing with lawyers, EC 6-641 admonishes attorneys
to do nothing to limit their liability in regard to malpractice. It is
reasonable, in light of these ethical considerations, to interpret this
provision as meaning that an attorney should not handle a matter
to which he or she would be unable to respond in damages should
his or her own neglect or incompetence impose a loss on the client.
The bar opens itself up to criticism when it allows attorneys to accept
cases that are not within their competence, if at the same time it fails
to require that attorneys be able to respond in damages in the event
that the unwary client is injured through neglect or incompetence.
Disciplinary sanctions alone are insuffidrent because they fail to address
the economic loss suffered by the injured client.
Several states have already set up Client Security Funds to pro-
tect against the wilful misconduct of attorneys. 4"  Recognizing that
disciplinary procedures alone failed to protect the individual client
in the case of attorney embezzlement or other intentional misuse of
client property, thirty-six states now require all active members of
the bar to contribute to the Client Security Fund from which the
victim is compensated. 43  Just as disciplinary standards alone were
an insufficient response to wilful misconduct, they are also an insuffi-
cient response to our present concern of attorney negligence and
incompetence.
The present public protection scheme includes guards against
unqualified applicants, methods of removing grossly incompetent, neg-
ligent, and dishonest attorneys, and security against wilful wrong-
doers. The logic would be completed by providing security for the
unwary victim of attorney incompetence or neglect.
The Legal Bases
Although the professional liability fund may appear to be the
next logical step in a comprehensive plan by which the legal pro-
fession can ensure quality services while securing the public against
41. Id. Corresponding disciplinary rules make these ethical considerations more
than aspirational: ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 6, DR 6-101,
6-102 (1975).
42. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6140.5 (West 1974).
43. Clients' Security Fund, 96 ABA ANNUAL REPORTS 595 (1971).
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occasional professional lapses and providing lower cost liability in-
surance, many attorneys question the legality of the plan.44 The state,
generally, has broad power to regulate attorneys.45  Because of the
lawyer's unique, traditional role as an officer of the court, the inherent
power to exercise this regulatory function vests in the courts.46 The
power of the court to make reasonable rules and regulations regard-
ing the conduct of attorneys is no longer open to question.47 The
legislature, through the use of its police power, also has the right
to regulate the bar.48  The legislative power to regulate attorneys is
incidental to its general power to protect the public. 49 Either the
court or the legislature could require the implementation of the Pro-
fessional Liability Fund.
Virtually every state that has considered the matter has deter-
mined that the legislature may pass laws supplementary to the in-
herent power of the court.50 In California, the court has held that
the only restraints on the legislature are reasonableness and nonin-
fringement of the court's right to prescribe additional conditions,51
although reasonable minimum legislative standards may be binding
on the courts.52  Some states give the legislature sole control over
educational requirements.5"
44. See note 6 supra.
45. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
46. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 789 n.18 (1975); Stratmore
v. State Bar of Cal., 14 Cal. 3d 887, 538 P.2d 229, 123 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1975); Board
of Comm'rs, Ala. State Bar v. State ex rel Baxley, 295 Ala. 100, 106, 324 So. 2d 256,
261 (1975); Beardsley, The Judicial Claim to Inherent Power Over the Bar, 19 A.B.A.J.
509 (1933).
47. American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 126 N.J. Super.
577, 316 A.2d 19 (1974) (upholding court-imposed contingent fee limits in personal
injury cases).
48. See generally Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal. 241, 85 Am. Dec. 62 (1864); Annot.,
144 A.L.R. 150 (1943).
49. E.g., In re Lavine, 2 Cal. 2d 324, 330, 41 P.2d 161, 163 (1935) (quoting
State v. Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 396, 240 N.W. 441, 450 (1932)).
50. See Annot., 144 A.L.R. 150, 151-54; Note, Admissions to the Bar and Separ-
ation of Powers, 7 UTAH L. REV. 82, 87 (1960). Robertson & Buehler, The Separa-
tion of Powers and the Regulation of the Practice of Law in Oregon, 13 WiLLAM-rL,
L.J. 273, 289, n.82 (1977), reports that at present only New York gives exclusive power
over admissions to the legislature.
51. In re Lavine, 2 Cal. 2d 324, 328, 41 P.2d 161, 162 (1935).
52. Id.; Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal. 241, 85 Am. Dec. 62 (1864). See also James v.
State, 61 Ga. App. 860, 7 S.E.2d 398 (1940); Hanson v. Grahan, 84 Kan. 843, 115
P. 646 (1911).
53. E.g., Institute of Metropolis, Inc. v. University of N.Y., 249 App. Div. 33, 291
N.Y.S. 893 (1936), aff'd, 274 N.Y. 504, 10 N.E.2d 521 (1937); Seawell v. Carolina
Motor Club, 209 N.C. 624, 184 S.E. 540 (1926).
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In addition, many states have given the boards of governors of
the state bars the power to formulate rules of professional conduct
with approval of the highest state court. 54  This practice has survived
the challenge of being an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. 5   There are, of course, limits on how much power can be
delegated to the state bar associations. There is no longer any doubt
that although these associations are subject to the antitrust laws,"6
a state's actions are not.57  Whereas a bar-imposed mandatory in-
surance program would be subject to attack as a monopolistic practice.
the state in its role as sovereign may compel attorneys to join together
for concerted action in the public interest.,
An example of the state's broad power to regulate attorney con-
duct can be found in Lathrop v. Donohue,5 9 where the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the state may compel attorneys
to join state-wide bar associations, known as integrated bars, even
when these organizations use compulsory dues and assessments to sup-
port legislation to which an individual attorney is opposed. 0  Over
half of the states now have such an integrated bar, 1 and it has been
upheld whether established by statute, 2 or by rule of court.63
Courts have also held that attorneys may be required to contrib-
ute to the maintenance of funds specifically established to reimburse
the client-victim who has been damaged by an attorney. 6 4  In order
54. See, e.g., Barton v. State Bar of Cal., 209 Cal. 677, 289 P. 818 (1930).
55. Id.
56. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975).
57. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See also Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co..
428 U.S. 579 (1976).
58. For a more in depth look at the state action antitrust exemption, see Note.
The State Action Antitrust Exemption: The Confinement of the Parker Doctrine Within
the Emerging Cantor Formula, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 211 (1977).
59. 367 U.S. 820 (1961). See also In re Rhodes, 370 F.2d 411 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 999 (1967).
60. Lathop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961); see Annot., 151 A.L.R. 617
(1944); MCKEEN, THE INTEGRATED BAR (1963); State Bar Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§ 6000-6172 (West 1974).
61. ABA, DIRECTORY OF BAR AssoCIATIoNs, BAR EXECUTIVE HANDBOOK (1970)
62. Herron v. State Bar of Cal., 24 Cal. 2d 53, 147 P.2d 543, cert. denied, 323
U.S. 753 (1944); Hill v. State Bar of Cal., 14 Cal. 2d 743, 97 P.2d 236 (1939).
63. Lathop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961); Application of the President of
Montana Bar Ass'n, 163 Mont. 523, 518 P.2d 32 (1974); In re Unification of N.H. Bar,
109 N.H. 260, 248 A.2d 709 (1968).
64. E.g., In re Member of the Bar, 257 A.2d 382 (Del.), appeal dismissed sub
nom. In re Reed, 396 U.S. 274 (1969).
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to protect the public from wilful conversions, embezzlements, and
misuse of property, the Client Security Fund was proposed and first
instituted in the United States in Vermont in 1959.65 In each of the
thirty-five states that has since adopted this plan,G6 all state-licensed
attorneys are required to pay an annual assessment from which the
victims of attorney misappropriation are reimbursed.76 The Client
Security Fund has been established by order of court" and by stat-
ute.609 It has been upheld in states with an integrated bar70 and in
states with a nonintegrated bar.7'
Although Justice Douglas dissented from the Court's approval of
the integrated bar in Lathrop72 because he believed that it intruded
upon freedom of association,7 3 he specifically distinguished the Client
Security Fund as an example of the kind of compulsory group require-
ment that properly falls within the regulatory power of the state. 4
Justice Douglas viewed breaches of fiduciary responsibility as a risk
properly distributed among all members of the profession.--
The Supreme Court of Delaware accepted Justice Douglas' idea
of collective responsibility in upholding that state's Client Security
Fund.70 The court reasoned that the bar, by setting the standards
for admittance, holds out to the public that all members in good
standing are "competent, honest, and devoted to their client's inter-
65. ABA, ABA Develops a Model Plan for Client's Security Fund, BAR EXECUTIVE
KEY HANDBOOK (May 1971); Voorhees, A Progress Report, 46 A.B.A.J. 496 (1960).
The Canadian pioneer statute is found in Alberta. ALTA REV. STAT. § 31a, ch. 294
(1942).
66. Clients' Security Fund, 96 ABA ANNUAL REPORTS 595 (1971).
67. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CODE § 6140.5 (West 1974). See generally Annot.,
53 A.L.R.3d 1298 (1973).
68. In re Member of the Bar, 257 A.2d 382 (Del.), appeal dismissed sub nona.
In re Reed, 396 U.S. 274 (1969).
69. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6140.5 (West 1974).
70. E.g., In re Client Security Fund, 254 Ark. 1075, 493 S.W.2d 422 (1973);
Whittier Union High School Dist. v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. App. 3d 504, 510, 136
Cal. Rptr. 86, 90 (1977); Bennett v. Oregon State Bar, 256 Or. 37, 470 P.2d 945
(1970).
71. E.g., In re Member of the Bar, 257 A.2d 382 (Del.), appeal dismissed sub
nom. In re Reed, 396 U.S. 274 (1969).
72. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
73. Id. at 881.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. In re Member of the Bar, 257 A.2d at 383 (Del.), appeal dismissed sub nom.
In re Reed, 396 U.S. 274 (1969).
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est."7 The court observed that it is only natural, therefore, for the
organized bar as a whole to be considered responsible to the defrauded
client.7
8
The Supreme Court of Oregon 79 and the Federal District Court
in Massachusetts 80 have joined the Delaware court in rejecting con-
stitutional arguments against these compulsory contribution public
trust funds. The Oregon court, relying on the reasoning in Lathrop,
held that it does not violate due process or equal protection of the
laws to require the beneficiaries of a highly regulated profession to
pay the cost of elevating standards8' and that the assessment does
not amount to a tax or unauthorized delegation of legislative power.
82
The courts have found the Client Security Fund to be associated with
the ethical standards which the courts have primary responsibility to
maintain " and have held it to be reasonably related to the legitimate
state interest in raising the quality of legal services.
8 4
The reasoning that supports the Client Security Fund also sup-
ports the Professional Liability Fund. There can be no doubt but
that competence and care are legitimate ethical concerns and are sub-
ject to state regulation.8 5 Incompetence and neglect, like dishonesty,
are risks of the profession that should be distributed among the mem-
bers. Indeed, the risk of harm from negligence is much greater than
the risk of harm from fraud, both in terms of frequency and economic
cost. The legal profession must accept its responsibility to insure the
public against loss from either risk.
The idea of compulsory liability insurance is neither new nor
radical. There is no longer any question as to whether the states
have the right to require insurance as a condition of carrying on an
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id.
79. Bennett v. Oregon State Bar, 256 Or. 37, 470 P.2d 945 (1970).
80. Hagopian v. Justices of Supreme Judicial Court, 429 F. Supp. 367 (D. Mass.
1977), aff'd, 98 S. Ct. 34 (1977).
81. Bennett v. Oregon State Bar, 256 Or. 37, 43, 470 P.2d 945, 948 (1970)
(quoting Lathop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961)).
82. In re Member of the Bar, 257 A.2d 382 (Del.), appeal dismissed sub nom. In
re Reed, 396 U.S. 274 (1969).
83. Id. at 383.
84. Bennett v. Oregon State Bar, 256 Or. at 43, 470 P.2d at 948 (quoting Lathop
v. Donohue, 367 U.S. at 843).
85. See notes 11-12 & accompanying text supra.
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activity that exposes the public to a significant risk of harm. 6 The
United States Supreme Court has recognized such power as legitimate
for over forty years.8 7 For example, in the case of employers, the
state has required financial responsibility for all injuries to employees
arising in the course of employment, regardless of fault."" The state
also imposes financial responsibility requirements on some occupations
in which negligence could cause an unwarranted risk of financial
harm, such as notaries and building contractors.8 9
Perhaps the most familiar type of compulsory liability insurance
is that which relates to motor vehicles. The state's requiring this
type of insurance was sustained by the United States Supreme Court,
against a due process challenge, as a valid exercise of the police power:
"Any appropriate means adopted by the states to insure competence
and care on the part of its licensees . . . is consonant with due
process."90 The legality of compulsory automobile insurance cannot
be distinguished from attorney malpractice insurance on the ground
that it is concerned with a bodily injury as opposed to property dam-
age. As is made evident by the contractor and notary statutes men-
tioned above, the state may require financial responsibility of those
whose negligence would cause only financial harm. Furthermore, a
mishandled legal matter can certainly have as lasting and damaging
an impact on the well-being of a person as many physical injuries.
The real interest of the state is in protecting members of the public
from risks of harm from which they may be unable to protect them-
selves. The interest of the state is in protecting against a risk of harm:
whether the harm is economic or bodily is not legally significant.
The courts have emphasized that, notwithstanding language pro-
viding indemnity for the insured, compulsory liability insurance is
intended primarily for the innocent victim. 9' The issue, therefore, is
not whether the attorney should be free to insure against his or her
86. Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933) (auto liability insurance).
87. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Continental Baking Co. v. Wood-
ring, 296 U.S. 352 (1932) (regulation of highways for public safety).
88. See, e.g., Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499
(1923); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1971).
89. E.g., CAL. GoVT CODE § 8212 (West 1966) (notary Bond); CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 7071.5 (West 1975) (contractor Bond).
90. Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 36 (1941), quoted in Escobedo v. State Dep't
of Motor Veh., 35 Cal. 2d 870, 876, 222 P.2d 1, 5 (1950).
91. See, e.g., American Homeowner's Ins. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp.
632, 634 (D. Md. 1967).
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own negligence; the focus of the state's concern is on the client, not
the attorney. The client bears the direct risk of injury from mal-
practice.
As the foregoing demonstrates, the base upon which to erect the
Professional Liability Fund has already been provided by extant social
institutions and policy, such as compulsory insurance for state licen-
sees, the integrated bar, and the Client Security Fund. The Profes-
sional Liability Fund is an extension of existing logic and represents
a difference only in degree, not in kind. It is well established that
the practice of law is a privilege that the state may grant upon con-
dition. Constitutional rights, however, do not turn upon whether a
government benefit is characterized as a privilege or a right.92 The
client protection fund must be both reasonable and not overly bur-
densome if it is to withstand constitutional challenge.
"The presumption of reasonableness is with the state."93 The
legislature has relatively few limits where strictly social legislation is
concerned, and it "has a broad discretion in classification in the exer-
cise of its power of regulation ....- 94 Because lawyers cannot be
considered a suspect class, 95 an equal protection challenge may be
met by demonstrating that there is a rational relation between the
classification, attorneys in private practice, and the legitimate state
interest, protecting the public through raising ethical standards and
the quality of legal services. 96  The argument that such a plan is
unreasonable because it does not cover other professionals has no
constitutional merit. An act is not unconstitutional merely because
it does not reach every abuse or cover all classes for which it may be
desirable.9 7 Likewise, since the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Nebbia v. New York,98 a substantive due process challenge
92. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971).
93. See Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 553 (1954).
94. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 566 (1931).
95. A suspect class is one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a
history of purposeful unequal treatment . . . as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
96. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); Dand-
ridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
97. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949); Bennett
v. Oregon State Bar, 256 Or. 37, 39, 470 P.2d 945, 947 (1970) (quoting Semler v.
Oregon Dental Examiners, 148 Or. 50, 63, 34 P.2d 311, 315 (1934), aft'd, 294 U.S.
608 (1935)).
98. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See also United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152-54 (1937), where the court discusses the rational basis test.
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of an economic regulation may be met by showing that the regulation
may "reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare."99
Although the professional liability fund may, as some have argued,
interfere with the attorney's right to contract, "[l]egislation otherwise
within the scope of acknowledged state power not unreasonably or
arbitrarily exercised cannot be condemned because it curtails the
power of the individual to contract."100 Because the need can be
demonstrated, no real question of arbitrariness is involved.
The Professional Liability Fund would not be overly burdensome
when its cost to the legal profession is weighed against the public
benefit. Perhaps foremost in consideration is the reasonable expecta-
tion that such a plan would be instrumental in restoring public confi-
dence in the profession. The importance of public regard and trust
was mentioned by the Delaware court in upholding the validity of
the Client Security Fund: "The proper administration of justice will
falter if the Bar as a whole loses the confidence of the public . .. ."10o
There is a general feeling within the profession that there has been
a serious erosion in public confidence over the past few years, and
some commentators believe that this lower opinion of the bar is
causally related to the increased incidence of claims.102
In addition to such an important intangible benefit as increased
public confidence, the Professional Liability Fund would protect the
public from the threat of millions of dollars in losses while making
99. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). Recently the Supreme Court
of Kansas upheld a statute that, in addition to requiring mandatory medical malpractice
for physicians, requires mandatory contributions by practitioners to a public trust fund
the goal of which is to assure citizens redress should their damages from malpractice
exceed private coverage. State ex rel Schneider v. Leggett - Kan. 576 P.2d
221 (1978). In Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 850, 555 P.2d 399 (1976),
the Supreme Court of Idaho held that a statute making medical malpractice insurance
mandatory was rationally related to the welfare of the citizens of that state. Id. at
868, 555 P.2d at 408 (remanded on other grounds). A similar Kentucky statute has
been rejected in part because the state failed to present evidence demonstrating a need
to which the statute could be rationally related. McGuffey v. Hall, 557 S.W.2d 401,
414-16 (Ky. 1977).
100. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 543 (1935).
101. In re Member of the Bar, 257 A.2d at 383 (Del.), appeal dismissed sub noma.
In re Reed, 397 U.S. 274 (1969).
102. See, e.g., Blaine, Professional Liability Claims: An Increasing Concern for
Lawyers, 59 ILL. B.J. 302, 305 (1970); Stephenson, An Insurer Looks at Lawyers"
Professional Liability Insurance, BENCH AND BAn oF MINNESOTA 21 (Nov. 1966).
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insurance available to the attorney at a significantly reduced cost. °:0
An incidental benefit would be better data collection on the causes
and incidence of attorney malpractice. The very fact that all attor-
neys will have a financial stake in the quality of service, furthermore,
may be a motivating factor in more positive action to remove the
unfit from practice. Sometimes a squeeze of the purse results in
better vision.
Conclusion
One criterion that supposedly sets the professional apart from
the businessperson is a concern for public service before private profit.
Dean Pound said that a profession is a group of people who are "pur-
suing a learned art . .. in the spirit of public service .... .14
The legal profession has a virtual monopoly on formal conflict resolu-
tion. Lawyers benefit from a complex system that they control as
judges and through high representation, relative to other vocations, in
local, state, and national legislative bodies and executive governmental
positions. They have been given the privilege of self-regulation and,
therefore, have a responsibility to meet public expectations. Those
who profit by the system should insure against the almost inevitable,
if infrequent, injuries done to those who must turn to them to secure
their rights and plead their causes.
Through its elaborate certification procedures, the bar holds out
to the public that its members are competent and devoted to the cli-
ents' interests. This collective representation justifies, even demands,
a collective acceptance of responsibility when a member does not
live up to certain minimal expectations.
The bar now has the opportunity to accept this responsibility
before the courts or the legislature impose it upon them. If it acts
now, the bar can develop a cohesive plan to present to the court or
legislature for action that will have the flexibility to protect the varied
interests of the practitioners as well as the intergrity to protect the
client. If it fails to act, the bar may eventually be saddled with a
cumbersome piece of legislation that fails to meet the needs of the
public or the profession.
103. Booz, Allen, supra note 16, at 3-6.
104. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953).
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